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“The U.S. cannot go to war without con-
tractors” (Avant, 2005: 115).
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IntroductIon
Reliance on private organizations to pro-
vide security and military services to states, 
international organizations, and multina-
tional corporations (Avant, 2009, 104) has 
presented an increasing trend in recent years 
and has risen very quickly in the aftermath of 
the Cold War2. During the last decade of the 
past century, more than one hundred private 
military and security companies (pmsc) were 
known to have operations in over one hundred 
countries around the world and represented 
an estimate of $55.6 billion US in total an-
nual revenues already by 1990 (Holmqvist, 
2005: 1-7). “Recent estimates show that the 
security market is worth about US 100-165 
billion per year, and that it has been growing 
at an annual rate of 7–8 per cent” (Florquin, 
2011: 103).
These pmscs have become important 
tools to return order and stability to conflict-
affected scenarios by assisting the work of na-
tional and multinational security forces even 
in un peace operations (Avant, 2005: 8). Small 
Arms Survey recently published a study on 
the booming business of this phenomenon of 
the privatization of security in 70 countries. 
That research found that the total personnel 
employed today by private security compa-
nies “exceeds the number of police officers at 
the global level” (Florquin, 2011: 101): while 
pmscs employed 19,545,308 individuals, the 
number of police officers was only 10,799,059 
(p. 106). Yet, holding these companies and 
their employees accountable for their actions 
and omissions in peace and war times repre-
sents an even greater challenge since regulation 
over them is still scarce, and, as of today, it is 
not legally binding3.
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After the news of 17 innocent civilians 
killed by Blackwater employees in Nissour 
Square, Bagdad, became public, policy makers 
and academics began to pay closer attention 
to the expansion of the private military and 
security industry. Various studies have tried 
to evaluate the implications that the presence 
of these pmsc has had in countries such as 
Iraq, Afghanistan, South Africa, Sierra Leone, 
Angola, Haiti, and Colombia, among others. 
Most of the academic research available on the 
topic has focused on the importance of regu-
lating this private industry, on the potential 
risks that their activities pose to the protection 
of Human Rights, and on whether the use of 
force by pmscs challenges the modern State’s 
monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. 
However, not much research has concentra-
ted on the direct impact that the use of pmscs 
may have on the military force and on the 
military institution. This paper will try to ad-
dress this gap from a theoretical point of view, 
highlighting the impact of the use of pmscs on 
the role of today’s military.
The proliferation and diversification of 
private military and security companies is a 
process that will not slow down. Therefore, it 
is crucial to understand how and in which ways 
it affects and may continue to affect the role of 
the military force. The purpose of this paper 
is to determine the impact of the use of pmscs 
on military institutions and on the provision 
of security and defense services. It analyzes 
three specific domains where the role of today’s 
military may be more directly affected: the 
exercise of the monopoly of the use of violence, 
the professionalization of the military, and the 
process of enrollment of new recruits.
It is important to emphasize that these 
domains are not the only roles that the military 
should play or the only realms on which the 
use of pmscs may have some kind of impact. 
On the contrary, the essence of the military 
force has always been to help preserve political 
stability, to secure national sovereignty, and 
to protect the state from external aggression. 
Wendy Hunter, in a study regarding soldiers 
and states in Latin America, went even fur-
ther and identified four other functions and 
missions that a current military body should 
engage in: “(1) conventional defense of terri-
torial integrity; (2) international peacekee-
ping; (3) internal security, which includes 
counterinsurgency and drug interdiction; and 
(4) civic action and development functions” 
(Hunter, 1996: 4). However, for the purpose 
of this study, a special focus will be given to the 
three domains mentioned earlier because they 
embrace some of the vital and current tasks 
assumed by the military institution regarding 
its provision of security and defense services to 
the state and to the civilian community.
This analysis requires a review of the lite-
rature regarding the concept of the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force and the role of 
the military in the consolidation of modern 
democratic states, as well as a review of the 
effect of pmscs on the theory and balance of 
civil-military relations. In this sense, the gene-
ral objectives of this paper are to broaden the 
research on the impact of the privatization of 
security in the evolution of the modern state 
and to highlight from a theoretical perspective 
how turning to private armed groups to pro-
vide security and military services affects the 
current role of the public military profession.
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The current paper is divided into four 
parts. The previous introductory section des-
cribed the modern industry of the private 
provision of security and military services, 
exposed the main purpose of this document, 
and identified the specific domains of analysis 
of the paper. The second section presents in 
detail the origin of pmscs and the rise that the 
industry has had in recent decades. The third 
part is the central section of the paper. It ela-
borates on the concept of the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force and analyzes the impact 
of pmscs on the exercise of that monopoly by 
the military, on the professionalization of the 
military, and on the process of enrollment of 
new recruits.
the rIse of the PrIvate MIlItary  
and securIty servIces Industry
The conception of the state’s monopoly 
of the use of force has been constantly cha-
llenged along history and is still being cha-
llenged today. Among the literature on the 
formation of states, Max Weber argued that 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
is the central characteristic of the modern 
state (Webber, 1994: 310-311). For Michael 
Mann, that monopoly is also the basis for the 
state’s power (Mann, 1984: 187). However, 
the use of coercive means to provide security 
to the state and its citizens has not always been 
a totally exclusive characteristic of the state. 
Pirates, corsairs, mercenaries, and private 
contractors have provided their services to 
states, kingdoms, empires, and all other forms 
of political organization in order to fulfill the 
duties commanded to them by the relevant 
ruler or authority (Holmqvist, 2005: 1; Avant, 
2005: 1). Today, a tendency to rely on private 
organizations to provide security and military 
services has increased even more and has been 
growing exponentially during the last three 
decades (Singer, 2001: 189).
The increasing trend towards the priva-
tization of security began in the aftermath 
of the Cold War and has already spread all 
over the world (Richards and Smith, 2007: 
3; Holmqvist, 2005: 1). The end of the war 
was characterized by a massive downsizing 
of the defense sectors and a reduction in the 
amount of personnel, which translated into 
smaller armed forces and less security-related 
costs for the state (Shreier and Caparini, 2005: 
3-4; Cohn, 2010: 24; Holmqvist, 2005: 2). 
The downsizing of security forces enlarged the 
supply of trained workforce that afterwards 
was eagerly demanded by private companies 
interested in the security business. At the same 
time, the withdrawal of major powers from 
certain regions of the world, the emergence of 
new wars in the developing countries during 
the 1990’s, and the tendency to outsource 
military training motivated the involvement 
of private security providers in conflict zones 
(Shreier and Caparini, 2005: 3-4; Cohn, 
2010: 24; Holmqvist, 2005: 2).
Summarizing what different scholars have 
explored regarding the origins of the rise of 
the private industry of military and security 
services, it may be affirmed that there are three 
main factors that led to the consolidation of 
pmscs by the end of the xx century. First, the 
downsizing of the defense sector: a reduced 
budget and the need to make the state more 
cost-efficient encouraged the assistance of 
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the private sector to fulfill the tasks that the 
security sector was not able to do efficiently 
anymore but that were still required. Second, 
the reduction of military personnel: a reduced 
budget of the defense sector together with the 
tendency to discontinue conscripted armies 
obliged the military institutions to cutback 
men and women that were not indispensable, 
and when more personnel was required in spe-
cific or extraordinary circumstances, the pri-
vate sector became the perfect ally to provide 
the needed human resources. These available 
human resources turned out to be, in many 
occasions, the same men and women that 
used to belong to formal military institutions.
Third, the high salaries offered by the pri-
vate sector: those men and women, who were 
left aside by the public security sector of many 
governments, found in the private industry the 
perfect possibility to get back into the business 
for which they were trained. At the same time, 
well-trained and talented personnel began to 
be offered better salaries in the private sector. 
This offer gave them an incentive to drop out 
from public military institutions and to enlist 
with private providers of military and security 
services. In this sense, armies had to rely once 
again in private companies to get a hold of the 
well-trained personnel who they did not have 
any more in their ranks.
In this context, private security agents 
became structured corporations that com-
mercialized the provision of security and 
military services and tried very hard to diffe-
rentiate themselves from simple mercenaries 
or illegitimate coercion groups (Singer, 2001: 
191; Holmqvist, 2005: 2). The services they 
provided supported the activities carried out 
by public security forces ranging “from tacti-
cal combat operations and strategic planning 
to logistical support and technical assistance” 
(Singer, 2005: 120).
Due to this wide range of activities, Sin-
ger tried to categorize them into three diffe-
rent groups: military provider firms, military 
consulting firms, and military support firms4. 
pmscs from each group became very popular 
among states, international and humanita-
rian organizations, corporations, and even 
individuals: they proved to be –at first– more 
efficient and effective than public security 
providers, and in many cases, they offered 
higher levels of security when compared to 
their public counterparts (Singer, 2001: 189; 
Leander, 2005: 606). However, as their popu-
larity increased, the difficulties and inquiries 
around the use of private providers of security 
also began to rise.
All over the world grave scandals invol-
ving the presence of pmscs in cases of viola-
tions of human rights and abuse of national 
laws became a public concern. One of the 
most publicized cases took place in Septem-
ber, 2007 in Iraq, more precisely in Nisour 
4 “The industry is divided into three basic sectors: military provider firms (also known as ‘private security firms’), 
which offer tactical military assistance, including actual combat services to clients; military consulting firms, which 
employ retired officers to provide strategic advice and military training; and military support firms, which provide 
logistics, intelligence, and maintenance services to armed forces, allowing the latter’s soldiers to concentrate on com-
bat” (Singer, 2005: 120-121).
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Square, a busy square in Bagdad. Employees 
of Blackwater usa, at the time a contractor 
offering security services to officials of the US 
State Department, “proceeded to shoot and 
kill 17 civilians, wounding numerous others” 
(Cotton et al., 2010: 26).
In addition, the employment of Colom-
bian demobilized paramilitaries in Honduras, 
the presence of unauthorized private armed 
groups disguised as pmscs in Afghanistan, 
and “the alleged involvement of two United 
States-based corporations, caci and L-3 Ser-
vices (formerly Titan Corporation), in the tor-
ture of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison” 
(General Assembly, 2010: 5-7) highlight the 
critical challenges posed by the lack of control 
over pmscs. The International Humanitarian 
Law does not refer to pmscs and “there is no 
discrete regulation of pmcs as such” (Doswald-
Beck, 2007: 115); only under some very 
specific circumstances certain legal aspects 
of existing law may be applied to them. This 
situation also raises questions over the impact 
that these companies may have on national 
and international security policies, as well as 
on the role and morale of national armed for-
ces all around the world.
IMPact of PMscs on the MIlItary
Most of the scholarly literature related 
to pmscs has focused on two broad subjects: 
first, the circumstances that led to the rise of 
the private military industry: and second, the 
legal vacuum in which these companies ope-
rate. Academics have concentrated on these 
topics in order to understand the emergence of 
the phenomenon of pmscs, identify the reper-
cussions of using them in armed conflicts, and 
suggest possible ways to control and regulate 
them. In contrast, the social science field has 
studied very little about the alteration of the 
role of the military due to the surge of pmscs.
Peter Singer and Elke Krahmann, in sepa-
rate academic works, have agreed on the fact 
that among the various studies regarding the 
expansion of the market of private military 
firms, its impact on civil-military relations 
has not been sufficiently addressed and even 
neglected (Singer, 2008: 191-205; Krahmann, 
2008: 247-265). “Very little exploration of 
the impact of outside actors on civil-military 
relations or regime survival has occurred, and 
certainly no studies have been performed on 
corporate military actors in this role” (Singer, 
2008: 196). Likewise, insufficient academic 
attention has been given to the impact of 
pmscs on the recruitment process, which is 
actually one of the most important tasks of 
any military institution.
In this sense, Lindy Heinecken and Mi-
chon Motzouris carried out one of the few 
studies that tried to satisfy what Singer deman-
ded. They aimed to “show how the practice 
of outsourcing or privatizing military work is 
affecting the relevance, capacity, and capabili-
ties of national armed forces” (Heinecken and 
Motzouris, 2011: 78). Although they do touch 
specific issues regarding the effect of pmscs on 
the capacity and capabilities of the armed for-
ces, their study is still too broad. The current 
paper, trying to fill this academic gap, intends 
to be much more specific. The analysis exposed 
in the paper is restricted to the impact of pmscs 
on three particular aspects: the exercise of the 
monopoly of violence, the professionalization 
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of the military, and the process of enrollment 
of new recruits.
discussion on the concept  
of the monopoly of violence
Before the concept of a modern-state ca-
me to exist, and with it the thought of a strong 
military exercising the monopoly of the use of 
coercive means within a given territory, armies 
were already part of society, although they did 
not enjoy such monopoly at that time. On 
the contrary, individuals were encouraged 
to hold their own weapon as a sign of social 
wealth and personal safety. André Corvisier, a 
French scholar specialized in military history 
of the xvii century, gives a clear explanation of 
this social attribute: “The exercise of arms was 
accorded the highest respect among all human 
activities by the societies of the ancient regi-
me. […] it was also the expression of a moral 
setting in which violence and respect for force 
characterized relationships among individuals” 
(Corvisier, 1979: 3).
During the xviii century, when the Age 
of Enlightenment promoted various cultural, 
political, and economic changes in Europe, a 
clear differentiation took place regarding the 
importance of the possession and use of arms 
in western European states in contrast to that 
given by central and eastern ones. While there 
was a “lowered esteem for arms in western Eu-
rope, in central and eastern Europe those ru-
lers who were inspired by the Enlightenment 
tried to create a military framework that called 
for a still greater respect for arms” (Corvisier, 
1979: 20).
This contrast regarding the esteem for 
arms within the European states is directly 
related to the upcoming theory of the con-
solidation of the modern state proposed by 
Charles Tilly. Tilly argued that the process of 
state-making in western European countries 
was characterized by the accumulation and 
concentration of political authority and war-
making (and policing) resources (Tilly, 1990: 
27-30). Those resources were embodied in 
strong armies to whom a centralized political 
authority granted the exclusive privilege of 
using and exercising violence. This process 
was successful in western European states gi-
ven that in their territory, since the esteem for 
weapons declined, individuals were dissuaded 
from carrying them, and only a limited group 
of professionals had the approval for using 
force. Other European countries that did not 
follow this dynamic were not able to concen-
trate the use of coercive means under only one 
institution.
This argument is supported by Corvisier, 
when he affirms that in the long process of 
increasing the levels of discipline within the 
armed troops, reducing abuses from the offi-
cers, and making soldiers more committed, by 
the xviii century in Europe, the state began to 
rise as the unit with the necessary authority 
and power to control the armies. A superior 
hierarchy slowly deprived captains and other 
proprietary officers from their positions of 
authority over their regiments. It came to a 
point in which “the armed forces that were 
to oppose each other during the Wars of the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empi-
re were firmly under the control of the States” 
(Corvisier, 1979: 72).
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Tilly’s approach towards the process of 
European state-making and Corvisier’s des-
cription of the authority of the state to control 
national armies, together with the popular 
definition of Max Weber regarding the mono-
poly of the legitimate use of force as the central 
characteristic of the modern state and Michael 
Mann’s assertion about this monopoly being 
the basis for the state’s power, are very valuable 
contributions to the relation between the use 
of violence and the existence of the modern 
state. However, as much as their arguments 
seem logic and reasonable, heavy criticism 
towards them has not been absent in acade-
mic spheres.
Buzan considers that the dominant power 
of the state and its control of the coercive 
means in society is a “theory [that] is close 
to reality [only] in a large minority of states” 
(Buzan, 1991: 58-59), and Singer affirms that 
“the monopoly of the state over violence is the 
exception in world history, rather than the ru-
le” (Singer, 2008: 19). Certainly, a successful 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force is a 
characteristic that only a few states had the 
sufficient authority to claim. Furthermore, 
it may be affirmed that states were not able 
to exercise the monopoly of violence entirely 
through their own military forces by the end 
of the xix century, nor are they able to do so 
today: the presence of pmscs is the most recent 
example.
Private provision of military services 
has existed since the army of King Shulgi of 
Ur in the year 2094 B.C.E., passing by an-
cient Greek armies, and all the way up to the 
Carthaginian Empire to fight the First and 
Second Punic Wars (Singer, 2008: 19-22). 
More recently, during the Middle Ages, the 
nobility and the businessmen “produced the 
German Landsknechte, the Swiss Reisläufer, the 
Italian condottieri and the English mercenaries” 
(Cockayne, 2006: 465) in order to protect 
the promising commercial system rising in 
Europe. During this time, the notion of the 
monopoly of force did not exist. As time went 
by, political power began to be centralized and 
the concentration of the use of coercive means 
under only one authority was imposed as the 
model that needed to be achieved. Yet, today 
it is still possible to find active mercenaries 
fighting a wide variety of wars, as well as cor-
poratized providers of military services (Singer, 
2008: 45) reflected in pmscs.
In this sense, the notion of the monopoly 
of the use of coercive means has never been a 
genuine monopoly of the state, at least under 
the scope of the institutions or organizations 
that exercise it. The modern state is the natural 
authority that may claim such monopoly and 
the military forces are the ones entitled to exer-
cise it, but very frequently states have relied on 
non-state –or private– expressions of military 
and security services to effectively implement 
that monopoly. Cockayne affirms that mo-
dern “states alone are authorized to organize 
legitimate violence […], [making them] the 
mutually recognizing, oligopolistic principals, 
each with a monopoly on legitimate violence 
within their own territory” (Cockayne, 2007: 
199), leaving pmscs and other non-state actors 
as the agents under the principal-agent theory.
In order to preserve its monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force, the state then has the 
power to delegate the use of coercive means on 
any agent or institution it considers necessary, 
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meanwhile it can assure control over them. 
The military forces are part of the state and 
as such, are controlled and supervised by the 
latter – except in situations of military coups, 
in which evidently the monopoly over legiti-
mate violence is shattered. The same is true 
in the case in which the state hires pmscs to 
fulfill the security demands that the national 
armed forces are incapable of satisfying. The 
state has a certain degree of control over pm-
scs through the contracts that the companies 
have committed to respect, so, although those 
companies have the potential to use force, it 
may be affirmed that the state’s monopoly is 
not endangered.
Impact of pmscs on the exercise  
of the monopoly of violence
pmscs do not challenge the state’s mono-
poly of the use of violence: these companies are 
instruments, tools, or agents through which 
the state exercises its monopoly. However, 
since the military forces are the natural agents 
used by states, the increasing presence of pm-
scs creates an uncomfortable environment 
of suspicion regarding the impact that they 
may have on the activities performed by the 
military. As it will be exposed in the upcoming 
paragraphs, today’s military force has become 
very dependent on pmscs to perform many of 
its traditional activities in the exercise of the 
monopoly of violence.
The fear of becoming dependent on pm-
scs was already expressed some years ago by 
Peter Singer as he began to study in depth the 
phenomenon of the privatization of security. 
He stated that within the state’s inclination 
to privatize many of its functions, and taking 
into consideration the principal-agent theory, 
another “danger with outsourcing is that the 
principal/client may become too dependent 
on the private military agent, risking what 
is known in economics as ‘ex-post holdup’” 
(Singer, 2008: 158). Relying too much on 
the agent may hinder the strategies, objecti-
ves, and desires of the principal, in this case, 
the state.
Singer’s approach is evident in Paul 
Verkuil’s description of the indispensability 
of pmscs in current armed conflicts, as he 
addressed the intervention of United States 
in Iraq. He stated that “the United States 
went to war with a level of force that made 
contractors necessary. Contractors are now so 
entrenched they have become indispensable. 
Now they even negotiate directly with Iraqi 
and U.S. military forces” (Verkuil, 2007: 29). 
According to his argument, pmscs become 
indispensable, among other things, because 
regular military forces are not enough to fulfill 
all the responsibilities they have had to face 
in Iraq. But military forces have become de-
pendent on pmscs not only due to a reduced 
amount of personnel. The permanent use of 
pmscs by states has made military forces reliant 
on the services these companies offer, services 
without which the military would not be able 
to continue performing at all its own activities.
Heinecken and Motzouris also affirm 
that the rise of the private military industry 
together with small numbers in military ranks 
and the increasing desire to outsource security 
services translated into a high level of “depen-
dency of the military on the private sector to 
provide not only logistical, but also combat 
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support” (Heinecken and Motzouris, 2011: 
81). However, they do not state exactly which 
military tasks that have been privatized are the 
ones that do generate dependency on pmscs, 
and they do not analyze either, to what extent 
certain privatized activities have a more direct 
impact than others on the exercise of violence 
by the military force. This differentiation is 
important because some privatized activities 
may enhance the performance of the military 
while other privatized activities may hinder it.
Not all the tasks performed by the priva-
te sector related to the military force attempt 
against the capacity of the military to exercise 
violence. Since the time when the modern 
state began to concentrate and centralize its 
authority over the military force, it still re-
cognized the need to rely on the private sec-
tor to fulfill certain needs. Besides imposing 
discipline and control over the military, its 
management required other vital logistical 
activities to support the troops. Sovereigns 
and proprietary officers had to supply for 
food, clothing, weapons, and munitions, most 
of the time without enough money to cover 
all the expenses. Trying to avoid possible mu-
tinies and rebellions inside the military, they 
had to rely on private providers to supply the 
necessary items with less delay. These private 
entities turned out to be more flexible on pa-
yment deadlines than troops with direct access 
to means of violence (Corvisier, 1979: 66).
“Over the past two decades the range of 
military core functions which must not be 
contracted out has progressively declined” 
(Krahmann, 2008: 250). This has been en-
couraged even more by the increasing amount 
of military and security services provided by 
pmscs. Following Peter Singer’s categoriza-
tion of pmscs (2005: 120-121), military core 
functions began to be delegated to private 
companies beginning with those activities 
handled by support firms and have gradually 
increased to a point where even combat ope-
rations have been handled to private firms; 
the presence of these companies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are just two of the most evident 
examples.
For instance, in counterterrorist ope-
rations, the military forces may be useful in 
activities of deterrence, interdiction, intelli-
gence-gathering, and training of allied forces, 
among others. “Maritime and air forces can be 
employed in the interception of terrorist per-
sonnel and arms shipments” (Hughes, 2011: 
41). Furthermore, in a 2009 study carried 
out in the United Kingdom, it was stated that 
“counterterrorism, alongside other missions 
such as peacekeeping and coin, has been tradi-
tionally viewed by the U.S. military hierarchy 
as a distraction from missions more important 
to the national interest” (Hughes, 2011: 67).
Although, as Hughes affirms, the military 
may be useful in coin activities, the hierar-
chy of military functions, the need to avoid 
distractions from military missions, and the 
available services provided by pmscs, makes ac-
tivities such as gathering intelligence material 
and training military forces a new responsibi-
lity for these private providers of military and 
security services. This delegation of functions 
is not harmful per se. What may become har-
mful, as time goes by, is the excessive reliance 
on pmscs to perform these activities. The mi-
litary may lose its expertise on, for instance, 
intelligence gathering and training of military 
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forces, hence if pmscs cease to exist or become 
too expensive to contract their services, the 
military will not be able to take over those 
activities that it used to provide itself.
In addition, the challenging situation for 
the military regarding its dependence and re-
liance on pmscs is that the latter are hired most 
of the time directly by the state, not by the 
military institution: pmscs are hired to com-
plement the activities assigned to the military. 
Since the states are the ones that hire pmscs, 
these companies show the results of their ac-
tivities directly to the state and not necessarily 
to the military. Therefore, if the military requi-
res, for example, certain information product 
of intelligence gathering, an activity that was 
performed by a private company, the military 
would need to call on state officials in order to 
get that information.
This becomes even more complicated 
when a state hires pmscs to develop activi-
ties abroad as part of economic and political 
cooperation between states. In this case, as it 
happens between the U.S. and Colombia, the 
contracting state, for instance the U.S., is the 
one that gets all the reports regarding intelli-
gence gathering and critical information useful 
for counter-narcotic and counter-insurgent 
operations. The national government, in this 
case Colombia, and its national military do 
not get access to this information unless the 
contracting state provides it, although the 
private company that gathered that informa-
tion was in Colombian territory and under 
Colombian laws (Perret, 2009: 68). Once 
again, although the use of pmscs is intended 
to achieve better results, in some occasions the 
role and the activities that the military should 
perform may get hindered by the fact that it is 
a private entity and not the military institution 
directly the one that executes critical security 
and defense tasks.
Impact of pmscs on the professionalization of the 
military
The suitability of military personnel and 
its adequate or inadequate level of professio-
nalization is related to the increasing desire of 
the state to use private providers of security 
and military services. If the use of pmscs is 
growing exponentially due to their efficiency 
and capacity to develop activities in insecure 
environments, as some scholars allege, then 
it is valid to review why professional military 
personnel is not as competent as its private 
counterparts, and how the professionalization 
process is being affected by the constant, often 
unintentional, rivalry between both.
Traditional theorists on civil-military 
relations (cmr) theorists such as Huntington 
and Janowitz highlight that to ensure civilian 
control of public security and military forces, 
it is essential for the military and the police 
to be subordinated to the state (Huntington, 
1957: 17; Feaver, 1996: 158-167) and to en-
hance in them high levels of professionalism 
(Feaver, 1996: 158-167). A professionalized 
military that is subordinated to the state, is 
obedient, ethical, and has added moral and 
social values (pp. 158-167). A high level of 
professionalism also awakens a sense of duty 
and military culture to serve the state (Cohn, 
2010: 10). Furthermore, within a professio-
nalized military, “regular national soldiers are 
deterred from treason and revolt by a combi-
2 3 1
O P E R A , N o  1 2
nation of patriotism, unit loyalty, and a fear of 
punishment” (Singer, 2008: 165).
Contrary to this professionalized military, 
pmscs are not subordinated to any superior 
institution that may exercise some type of 
control over them. pmscs themselves, and the 
personnel they hire, do not follow this pro-
fessionalization path. Private security agents 
are corporations concerned mainly about 
business and the trends of the market, and 
its employees are professionals with military 
training that serve the corporative interests of 
their employers, without basing their actions 
upon loyalty or obedience to any government 
or state. Professionals involved in the provi-
sion of security and military services, who use 
violence and coercion in their daily activities, 
should be oriented towards serving the state 
and safeguarding the rights of its citizens. 
However, without any subordination to the 
state, the scarce control and supervision of the 
pmscs and its professional employees turns out 
to represent a major risk to the stability of the 
state, to the protection of civilians, and to the 
promotion of human rights.
Obedience to a superior authority, res-
pect towards an ethical behavior, high moral 
and social values, and undisputed loyalty to 
the state are key characteristics of a military 
professional. However, the professionals hired 
by pmscs do not share all these characteristics 
and therefore their degree of professionalism 
may not be compared at the same level as that 
of members of the military. It is possible that 
employees of pmscs are ethical in what they 
do, and they may also have high moral values, 
but it is clear that they are not subordinated to 
the state and they “have no particular loyalty 
to the state” (Burk, 2002: 22). Their loyalty is 
questioned when their incentive to perform 
their activities is not patriotism or a social 
or moral obligation towards the state, but 
instead what interests them is the economic 
profit in exchange for their services. pmscs do 
hire former military personnel who may ha-
ve been indoctrinated using the professional 
soldier model, but once they step out of the 
institution, their loyalty and obedience to the 
state may be as questionable as that of a non-
military-trained individual.
Moreover, private providers of military 
services “introduce into any military opera-
tion a degree of uncertainty that is not pre-
sent when soldiers perform the same task” 
(Stanger, 2009: 90). Personnel of pmscs may 
be professionals and experts in what they do, 
but they do not abide to the concept of a pro-
fessionalized military as expressed in previous 
paragraphs. Their performance is conditioned 
by individual interest and financial gain while 
the interest of the state, of the public in general 
is not important any more. As a subordinate 
institution, the professionalized military fo-
llows the strategies and guidelines of the state, 
fulfills its mission, and always protects the 
general public interest; if not, sanctions and 
punishments await. pmscs employees that do 
not follow the assigned tasks as they should do 
not fear any sanction or punishment as regular 
soldiers do. Although pmscs employees may 
comply perfectly with their duties, their level 
of responsibility may not be compared to that 
of a soldier, opening in this way a certain de-
gree of operational uncertainty regarding the 
different incentives and fears between soldiers 
and non-soldiers.
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In summary, the increasing presence of 
pmscs answers in part to a decline in the ranks 
of military forces all over the world and to a 
subsequent enrollment of these unemployed 
personnel in those companies. For these new 
private recruits, the process of military pro-
fessionalization comes to an end: with their 
new employer there is no subordination to 
any state institution, the financial gain beco-
mes the primary incentive, and the required 
loyalty, morale, ethics, and social values may 
carry different connotations. pmscs continue 
to be professionals in what they do, but they 
may not be leveled to the same degree of pro-
fessionalization of military personnel. In other 
words, within the realm of the provision of mi-
litary and security services in a state, the priva-
tization of security distorts the conception of 
professionalism put up front by cmr theorists.
Impact of pmscs on the process of enrollment of 
new recruits
“Converts to an all-volunteer force found 
universal military service both unaffordable 
and inconsistent with maintaining a compe-
tent, modern military” (Rostker, 2006: 5). 
This was the thought of many states that used 
to have a system of conscript militaries but in 
the second half of the xx century converted 
them into an all-volunteer force; the United 
States and many Western European countries 
followed this trend. This change in the process 
of enrollment of new recruits created an enor-
mous debate among political scientists and 
military scholars highlighting both the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each system. The 
rise of pmscs presents an additional element 
that expands such debate and impacts the role 
of the military institution in the recruitment 
of new personnel.
In order to understand the impact of 
pmscs on the process of enrollment of new 
recruits, it is necessary to understand the 
concepts of conscription and all-volunteer 
forces. The French scholar André Corvisier, 
a specialist in military history, has addressed 
in-depth the issue of conscription. The word 
conscription, as we know it today, became 
widely used only until the eighteenth century 
in Western Europe.
Rulers were forced either to turn to contractors or to 
insist upon military obligations of their subjects (obli-
gatory military service). The second solution came to be 
preferred, and after several attempts to create an effective 
military organization for smaller numbers of men, it led 
in the eighteenth century to the idea of general conscrip-
tion (Corvisier, 1979: 41).
At first, the military service was conside-
red a privilege exclusive for free men, entailing 
certain financial benefits and an increased so-
cial status. One of the first countries to have 
such military obligation on a permanent basis 
was Sweden.
Not all states adopted officially a system 
of a “compulsory universal military service”, 
as Corvisier renamed it. In fact, since the six-
teenth century there have been three different 
recruitment methods that have persisted, in 
different scales, until today: “recruitment of 
volunteers, who except in times of famine 
were given the best terms (doucer, Handgeld, 
and later argent du roi); impressment, and fi-
nally recourse to professional war contractors 
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(entrepreneurs de guerre)” (Corvisier, 1979: 
41-42). These volunteers are the origins of what 
today is called an all-volunteer force based on 
a liberal ideology.
These citizens should have the right to 
decide whether they would like to be part of 
a military body or not. The concept of an all-
volunteer force instead of simply volunteers 
developed mainly during the second half 
of the xx century as criticism arose over the 
excessive power exerted by the state over its 
citizens. From this historical background it is 
important to highlight that the use of private 
providers of security and military services exis-
ted since before a centralized military power 
began to be consolidated, and that the state 
considered this new type of military power 
a better agent through which to exercise the 
legitimate monopoly of the use of force, in 
contrast to relying on professional war con-
tractors.
As the end of the Cold War approached, 
states began to reduce their defense budgets 
and to downsize their military power; at the sa-
me time, the boom of pmscs was taking place. 
Conscription systems were also coming to an 
end in various states and all-volunteer armies 
were taking over. The situation did not seem 
to be very different from that of the sixteenth 
century where recruits for military bodies were 
selected through the three methods mentioned 
by Corvisier. However, one huge difference 
did exist in the twentieth century: the concept 
of the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force. Under this circumstance, the military, 
conscript or all-volunteer, but subordinated to 
the state, had to face a new competitor in the 
exercise of that monopoly, namely the pmscs, 
taking into consideration the desire of the state 
to keep low defense budgets and the growing 
tendency to have small permanent armies, 
among others.
Regarding the enrollment of new recruits, 
a conscript military might not worry too much 
about the presence of pmscs. However, an all-
volunteer army does. Turning from conscript 
recruits to all-volunteer personnel meant that 
conscripts were “replaced by homo economicus, 
motivated primarily by the personal skills, 
salary, and educational benefits that military 
service bequeaths” (Krebs, 2006: 4). This had 
a double negative consequence for the re-
cruitment process of the military institution: 
on the one side, the volunteer labor force 
becomes more expensive because it demands 
better salaries, benefits, and conditions in 
order to be part of the institution (Duindam, 
1999: 135); on the other side, pmscs offered 
a deal that the military institution could not 
match, as it granted better salaries, better be-
nefits, better conditions, and were interested 
in recruiting personnel with the best military 
skills possible. For example, “people working 
for pmscs in Colombia, for instance, reported 
being offered three times their salary to move 
to Iraq” (Avant, 2007: 458). Maintaining trai-
ned recruits within the ranks became a difficult 
task for the military.
A few centuries ago, the idea of having 
a conscript military, besides the need to have 
more enlisted recruits, was to grow among 
the civil population a sense of patriotism, 
of belonging, of loyalty to the state. An all-
volunteer military diminishes to some extent 
this objective as the economic gain becomes 
more relevant. But the introduction of person-
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nel hired by pmscs brings that initial objective 
almost to an end. “Private military companies 
are not representative of the community they 
serve, and this is a morally significant diffe-
rence between these companies and national 
military forces” (Wolfendale, 2008: 218). The 
military institution used to have -and still 
does- the role to generate feelings of patrio-
tism and loyalty to the state among civilians, 
a function that is being gradually taken away 
from it as private providers of military and 
security services are enlisting many of the 
potential recruits, that otherwise might have 
enlisted in the army.
The role played by the military in the 
recruiting of new personnel is also important 
to keep a close connection between the mili-
tary and the community. Since the military is 
one of the central agents of the state, this type 
of recruiting also strengthens the connection 
between the state and the community. In this 
sense, “maintaining the connection between 
the community and the military is important 
for two interrelated reasons. It means that go-
vernments must justify the use of military to 
the public and it means that governments do 
not have complete control over the public’s 
perception of and reaction to a war” (Wolfen-
dale, 2008: 217). Reducing this connection 
makes the community less interested in the 
activities in which its military is involved and 
it also avoids civilian oversight and criticism 
regarding the activities developed abroad by 
the state, especially when the state increases 
the use of pmscs, companies that have in 
many cases no connection whatsoever with 
the community.
conclusIons
The monopoly over the legitimate use 
of coercive means has been a notion that de-
veloped at the same time as the modern state 
consolidated itself in Western Europe. This 
modern state began to concentrate and centra-
lize its political authority over a specific terri-
tory and also over the military power. Certain 
states that were capable of developing a strong 
centralized authority claimed a complete 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence 
within its boundaries, and tried to exercise that 
monopoly through its military institutions. 
However, as the reviewed literature shows, 
besides the national armed forces, most states 
have had to rely on non-state actors to suc-
cessfully implement their alleged monopoly.
The state is the one that administers the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force and 
the military turns out to be the main and tradi-
tional agent through which the state exercises 
that monopoly. However the military has no 
exclusivity and the state has the capacity to use 
other security agents as well: pmscs appear as 
one of the other agents on which the state can 
rely on. Therefore, the presence of pmscs does 
not threaten the monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force: it only represents another actor 
with which the military has to work together 
on a competitive basis in order to fulfill the 
security and defense needs of the state.
One of the main impacts of the use of 
pmscs is that the military force is becoming 
very dependent on pmscs to perform many of 
its traditional activities regarding the exercise 
of the use of violence. They have become indis-
pensable in current armed conflicts, on both 
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logistical and combat operations, as well as in 
other activities that the state has also outsour-
ced to a great extent, such as the gathering of 
intelligence and the training of military forces. 
Although this delegation of functions is not 
harmful per se, an excessive reliance on pmscs 
to perform these activities is.
The use of pmscs supports many logisti-
cal operations of military activities, but when 
these companies take over crucial tasks, the 
military may lose its own expertise and skills 
to execute them. Military forces may rely on 
pmscs to do intelligence gathering and to tra-
in its troops, but relying too much on them 
would prevent the military from doing those 
same activities again once the pmscs stop 
providing those services. The military should 
exploit the advantages provided by pmscs, but 
it is also a very important duty to remember 
that the military’s role to train its troops and to 
implement other activities such as intelligence 
gathering continues to be its responsibility. 
These tasks will never cease to exist and there-
fore the military institution should always be 
prepared to overtake them and should avoid 
depending excessively on private companies 
to perform them.
Within the realm of the provision of 
military and security services to a state, the 
privatization of security distorts the concep-
tion of professionalism put up front by cmr 
theorists. Obedience to a superior authority, 
respect towards an ethical behavior, high mo-
ral and social values, and undisputed loyalty 
to the state are key characteristics of military 
professionals. However, pmscs employees do 
not share those exact same characteristics: they 
are not subordinated to the same superior 
authority, their ethical behavior and moral 
values are questionable, their loyalty toward 
the states that hire them may be disputed, and 
their main incentive is financial gain above all.
These private employees do not fear any 
sanction or punishment as regular soldiers do. 
This situation becomes very challenging for 
current military forces as they have to fulfill 
their duties working hand in hand with em-
ployees of pmscs that perform similar types 
of activities but with different accountability 
measures, different sorts of punishments, 
better levels of payment, and more flexible 
guidelines. It is important for military forces 
to encourage an adequate performance and 
behavior of its troops, as well as, to maintain 
a high level of moral and ethical standards 
in their activities, even though their private 
counterparts may not need follow the same 
parameters and still receive better salaries and 
better benefits.
Finally, individuals are motivated to work 
for pmscs by very similar incentives as the ones 
that promote the enrollment of volunteer 
forces in military ranks: specialized personal 
skills that should not be wasted, good salaries, 
and social benefits. However, while volunteer 
forces do become part of military institutions 
and in most cases follow the path of military 
instruction and military professionalization, 
pmscs employees, who belong to the private 
sector, do not follow that same military track. 
This marks a huge difference between them. 
Yet, working with pmscs appears to be an 
interesting and very attractive option for in-
dividuals seeking to be part of organizations 
(agents) with the capacity of using force. This 
situation obliges today’s military to strengthen 
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its recruitment strategies. Some options may 
include highlighting other benefits that indi-
viduals may receive once they enroll: public 
education in military institutions, public ser-
vice for the community, a secure career with 
a promising future, etc. In the process of re-
cruiting new personnel, it is also important for 
the military to recognize its role as the public 
institution capable of keeping a close connec-
tion between the military and the community: 
recruiting individuals from the community to 
serve the community enhances patriotism, so-
cial conscience, and promotes public oversight 
to force-related activities of the state.
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